Anaheim Ducks: What Can Dallas Eakins Learn From the Past?

Randy Carlyle wasn’t the answer for the Anaheim Ducks, but not everything he did was awful. Can Dallas Eakins learn from him and improve on his work?

Dallas Eakins is the third coaching hire that the Anaheim Ducks will have made under General Manager Bob Murray‘s stewardship over the past decade. Bruce Boudreau, when hired, was a darling of the analytics community after his relative success with the Washington Capitals. After a near-unprecedented run of success, he was let go by the Ducks and replaced by former Ducks and Maple Leafs coach Randy Carlyle.

Following Carlyle’s first season at the helm, in which the team reached the conference finals, disaster struck in the form of injury and the Ducks spiraled downwards over the two following seasons. Letting Carlyle go during last season, Bob Murray determined that he would not hire a caretaker coach for the remaining games last season, and instead took to the bench himself. This ensured that whoever would be the next head coach would have a full offseason to put their stamp on the game.

That next head coach, after a lengthy search, happened to be Dallas Eakins. Eakins is, of course, famed for his “swarm” defense, a defensive stratagem he attempted to implement in Edmonton, while with the Oilers. It didn’t work out at the time, and the coach moved on from the failed strategy relatively rapidly. So too did the Oilers move on from the coach.

Despite moving on from one faulty stratagem, the Oilers didn’t truly improve under Eakins and were actually far worse under him than the coaches who preceded him, and who replaced him. Since being let go by the Oilers, Eakins has been plying his trade with the Anaheim Ducks AHL affiliate, and by all accounts, doing so with some success. However, questions remain.

Whereas other head coaches may have taken their licks and worked as assistants for a time under various coaches, before clawing their way back to head coaching ranks (see Boston’s Bruce Cassidy), Eakins essentially jumped straight back into a head coaching role. While certainly a positive resume move, it also negated a potentially positive scenario of him being able to learn new skills and ideas under another coach.

Perhaps more importantly, he may have missed an opportunity in learning the communication skills required to be a head coach. An important consideration, given the rumor of the locker room discontent in Edmonton during his tenure there.

This, however, seems to be a consideration of both Eakins and the Anaheim Ducks. While Eakins was obviously hired because Bob Murray wanted him to implement his vision for play, Darryl Sutter was brought in as a coaching “mentor” of sorts. While not a typical arrangement in the NHL, this style of coaching has been implemented in other sports to varying degrees of success.

Without delving too far down that rabbit hole, in most cases, the strategy is designed and implemented by the head coach, while the delivery and the nuances of play may be assisted by the overseeing older mentor. It should be stated, however, that typically this arrangement would be an assistant coach, moving into a head coaching role, and the head coach moving into a mentor role. Similar to an apprenticeship.

So while Sutter may help Eakins with the art of coaching, what can Eakins learn from his predecessors? What worked and what didn’t? More importantly, why?

Pundits would pan everything former head coach Randy Carlyle did, however, that wouldn’t necessarily be fair, nor true. Too many players have succeeded under Carlyle for him to have no value. Even should it be the case that everything Carlyle did was terrible, there are learning opportunities in failure. For an incoming coach, who’s prior stint in the NHL was notable for being one of the worst coaching displays in recent history, opportunities to learn, improve and adapt should be taken with both hands. What then would be worthy of consideration?

The Lindholm and Manson Pairing

Pundits slammed Randy Carlyle when he moved Josh Manson away from Hampus Lindholm and persevered with the move long after it was apparent that both payers struggled apart. In part because of their strong play together, and weaker play apart, most fans expect them to be paired together to start the season under Eakins stewardship. However, this being the absolutely right thing to do should still be questioned.

On one side of the coin, it is undeniable that these two players have a symbiotic relationship and that they both play far better together than when apart. By default, when two of the 5 players your team is going to ice at a given time are playing well, that flow-on effect is felt for the duration of their time on ice. This was written about in more detail by Alex Novet who suggests that hockey is a “strong link game” or more perhaps more aptly stated, that the team with the best players on the ice will usually win. That is to say, for the ~25 minutes these two players are on the ice, the Ducks are a better team.

The other side of the coin is what then of the remaining ~35 minutes? Taking Novet’s conclusion to the next step, it makes some sense to distribute talent throughout the line-up, so that high-end talent is on the ice more often. That is to say, if Lindholm and Manson were separated, and if Lindholm was on the ice for ~25 minutes, and Manson was on for a separate ~25 minute period of time, the Ducks would have high-end talent on the ice for ~50 minutes of a 60-minute game. This hypothesis has further support from Dawson Sprigings, who suggests that balancing elite talent throughout the line-up has a better return on investment than consolidating it in one place.

The Anaheim Ducks, under Bruce Boudreau, could afford to play Lindholm and Manson together. They, at the time, had a wealth of defensive depth. The envy of the league, in fact, and all of it was young and talented. Certainly talented enough to make up for some of the weaker veteran players that were signed to fill in the experience gap at the time.

This season’s version, however, boasts far less depth than in previous seasons. Cam Fowler is still a Duck, however, behind him, there are more questions than answers. With Brandon Montour no longer with the organization, the most experienced NHL veteran is Michael Del Zotto. Korbin Holzer is the veteran defenseman behind him. Both of these players are perhaps best suited to 3rd pairing roles.

Jani Hakanpaa was signed as a player out of Finland, and while optimism may be high, the expectation should be low for the 25-year-olds first season in the NHL. Brendan Guhle, Jakob Larsson, Josh Mahura await their turn to play, and while their talent levels may be noteworthy, they’re still very much unproven.

Thus spreading the Ducks talent about the line-up, in this case separating Lindholm and Manson, makes some sense. At the very least the concept of spreading talent should be given serious consideration.

Considering the Options

However, it doesn’t mean it needs to be forever, nor even for the entirety of games. The basis for the spread of talent is so that the Ducks have high-end players on the ice at all times. The more high-end players they have, the easier this becomes and the sooner the Lindholm-Manson pairing can be reestablished. Currently, there are two options for this:

1. That the Ducks acquire a highly talented top 4 defenseman. While unlikely, there were rumors that Bob Murray had put in a bid for Kevin Shattenkirk’s services, prior to him signing in Tampa Bay.
2. The other option is that one of the current team members can step up to become a bona fide top 4 player. Presently there is hope for Guhle and Mahura to take that role, given their strong play in, albeit short samples in the recent past.

Additionally, there are obvious game situations in which it would necessitate a Lindholm-Manson pairing for team success. Game-close situations come to mind. Should the Ducks be holding onto a lead with minimal time remaining, and the game is there to be won, then reuniting your best shut down pairing would be a good move.

It would take a shrewd coach to pick the right time to do so, without subjecting players to excessive fatigue or put that pairing out too early, have them need a change, and have a weaker pairing on the ice in a key moment. It would most certainly take a shrewd coach to identify when this may be necessary and manage the bench accordingly. All that to say that Eakins should consider immersing himself in the data that is available, and at least consider the options.

The Long Pass

As a result of being on the receiving end of a sweep from the San Jose Sharks, the Ducks overreacted and pushed a playing style upon the team that they didn’t have the cattle to execute. The Sharks during their sweep were often seen making a long pass through the neutral zone to open ice in front of the high forward but behind the Ducks rear-guard. This pass to space allowed the Sharks forward to get in behind the Ducks defencemen, by utilizing two key points against them.

First, it is easier to skate fast without the puck. Even in sports such as soccer, it is difficult to ball handle while attempting to execute a maximum speed sprint. However, running onto a loose ball means that the attacking player already has been able to accelerate to a maximum pace and make few ball handling decisions once they reach the ball itself.

In this case, the Sharks forward could accelerate rapidly and once receiving the puck simply maintain their speed rather than needing to place more effort into acceleration. The second point is that the Ducks defenseman was required to either skate backward or turn around, to intercept the pass or player. Both of these movements are far slower than skating forwards.

Taken together, the Sharks forwards acceleration and the Ducks defenseman reduced speed, separating between the forward and defenseman can be established. This separation provides time with the forward to work with, and time allows for more options to be considered or utilized. Each further option is likely to create further space or room to work with.

Due to the freedom of puck movement, this stratagem appeared to be playing “fast.” Recognizing, and verbally communicating to the media, that the Sharks were not a team of fast skaters, Bob Murray directed the Anaheim Ducks under Randy Carlyle to implement a similar system of play. In itself, directing a team to play a faster style is not problematic. Ryan Stimson has the following to say in his book Tape to Space: Redefining Modern Hockey Tactic:

“Say a team attempts thirty shots and yields 20, resulting in controlling 60% of the shots. Now say that team plays a faster game and attempts 48 shots and yields 32, resulting in them controlling 60% of the shots. What has changed?”

The obvious answer is that the team controlling 60% of the shots has increased the shot differential from 10 to 16. We know that statistically speaking that a goalie on any night will have an average save percentage of x. Thus increasing the total number of shots is likely to increase the number of goals scored, should all other variables remain the same. A clear rationale for teams who control the play, to increase the pace of their games rather than slow them down.

Nevertheless, the inverse is also true. Should the team controlling 40% of the game’s shots increase the pace of the game, then they are likely to be outshot by more and thus be scored on more. The Ducks, of course, were one of those teams which were regularly outshot. In their case, pushing the tempo rather than slowing it down resulted in them being outshot by historic levels. At least in the early season.

It’s also worth noting that following Randy Carlyle’s departure from the team, the Ducks reverted to a system that was much closure to what Carlyle has implemented in the 2 seasons prior. That is to say a more reasonably paced game. They pushed the pace when it suited them, but for much of the time, it was far slower than it had been at the seasons start. While the return to health and match fitness of a number of the Anaheim Ducks better players was undoubtedly the underpinning cause of the improvement, the slower-paced game plan also helped to improve the overall shot metrics.

Lessons to Be Learned

While the long pass play could be considered an abject failure for the Ducks last season, it’s usage does present a number of learning curves for Coach Eakin’s should he wish to view them.

Firstly, passing into open space should be a high priority for the coach. It seems like it doesn’t need mentioning, yet how often have the Ducks (with the man advantage) pass the puck around to a player who is more or less standing still?

Ryan Getzlaf back to Cam Fowler the point, Fowler across the blue line, back to Fowler or down into the corner. Rinse, wash, and repeat. In sports like soccer or field hockey, it is typical for the attacking team to attempt to increase the depth and width of the field, whereas the defensive team looks to make it more narrow and shallow.

Creating space, creates time, and giving skilled players time to work with the puck allows them to find and create further options. Eventually, gaps will open and scoring opportunities will arise. The concept works as well at even strength.

Secondly, don’t force the players into a system. Create a new system based on the strengths of the players you have. Last season’s Ducks didn’t really have the capability to play a fast-paced game for 60 minutes. Whether that was due to injury, match fitness, conditioning, or simply player archetype is beyond the scope of this article.

Nonetheless, building game styles around your players seems to be the best idea. Taking that point further, this would suggest that each 5 man unit (3 forwards and 2 defensemen) would play in a slightly different manner. This would give a twofold effect of optimizing your player’s strengths, and to confuse the opposition which now has to adapt to the changing strategy.

Finally, do the unexpected. The league may currently be running with certain trends, and they may be the trends of winning teams. However, mimicry simply puts the Anaheim Ducks in step with other teams. They may be better than some or worse than others, but it provides no tactical advantage to copycat another teams game style. Be bold. Break the mold. Outside of the long pass, Carlyle’s team last season used the central corridor more than most teams.

This offensive zone entry point allows the fulcrum of the offensive “triangle” to have the most space to work with, as opposed to starting on a wing and having only one direction to go in (towards center ice). It’s hard to say whether this worked out, given that the Ducks as a team finished the season 50 goals below the league median. Trial and error.

Don’t be afraid of failure. If the data can support a reasoning to trial something, then try it. With that said, if another team is doing something that will work for your team, then steal it. Take it and run. Unashamedly. But don’t do it because it works for them, do it because it works for your players.