Anaheim Ducks: What Can Dallas Eakins Learn From the Past?
Randy Carlyle wasn’t the answer for the Anaheim Ducks, but not everything he did was awful. Can Dallas Eakins learn from him and improve on his work?
Dallas Eakins is the third coaching hire that the Anaheim Ducks will have made under General Manager Bob Murray‘s stewardship over the past decade. Bruce Boudreau, when hired, was a darling of the analytics community after his relative success with the Washington Capitals. After a near-unprecedented run of success, he was let go by the Ducks and replaced by former Ducks and Maple Leafs coach Randy Carlyle.
Following Carlyle’s first season at the helm, in which the team reached the conference finals, disaster struck in the form of injury and the Ducks spiraled downwards over the two following seasons. Letting Carlyle go during last season, Bob Murray determined that he would not hire a caretaker coach for the remaining games last season, and instead took to the bench himself. This ensured that whoever would be the next head coach would have a full offseason to put their stamp on the game.
That next head coach, after a lengthy search, happened to be Dallas Eakins. Eakins is, of course, famed for his “swarm” defense, a defensive stratagem he attempted to implement in Edmonton, while with the Oilers. It didn’t work out at the time, and the coach moved on from the failed strategy relatively rapidly. So too did the Oilers move on from the coach.
Despite moving on from one faulty stratagem, the Oilers didn’t truly improve under Eakins and were actually far worse under him than the coaches who preceded him, and who replaced him. Since being let go by the Oilers, Eakins has been plying his trade with the Anaheim Ducks AHL affiliate, and by all accounts, doing so with some success. However, questions remain.
Whereas other head coaches may have taken their licks and worked as assistants for a time under various coaches, before clawing their way back to head coaching ranks (see Boston’s Bruce Cassidy), Eakins essentially jumped straight back into a head coaching role. While certainly a positive resume move, it also negated a potentially positive scenario of him being able to learn new skills and ideas under another coach.
Perhaps more importantly, he may have missed an opportunity in learning the communication skills required to be a head coach. An important consideration, given the rumor of the locker room discontent in Edmonton during his tenure there.
This, however, seems to be a consideration of both Eakins and the Anaheim Ducks. While Eakins was obviously hired because Bob Murray wanted him to implement his vision for play, Darryl Sutter was brought in as a coaching “mentor” of sorts. While not a typical arrangement in the NHL, this style of coaching has been implemented in other sports to varying degrees of success.
Without delving too far down that rabbit hole, in most cases, the strategy is designed and implemented by the head coach, while the delivery and the nuances of play may be assisted by the overseeing older mentor. It should be stated, however, that typically this arrangement would be an assistant coach, moving into a head coaching role, and the head coach moving into a mentor role. Similar to an apprenticeship.
So while Sutter may help Eakins with the art of coaching, what can Eakins learn from his predecessors? What worked and what didn’t? More importantly, why?
Pundits would pan everything former head coach Randy Carlyle did, however, that wouldn’t necessarily be fair, nor true. Too many players have succeeded under Carlyle for him to have no value. Even should it be the case that everything Carlyle did was terrible, there are learning opportunities in failure. For an incoming coach, who’s prior stint in the NHL was notable for being one of the worst coaching displays in recent history, opportunities to learn, improve and adapt should be taken with both hands. What then would be worthy of consideration?
The Lindholm and Manson Pairing
Pundits slammed Randy Carlyle when he moved Josh Manson away from Hampus Lindholm and persevered with the move long after it was apparent that both payers struggled apart. In part because of their strong play together, and weaker play apart, most fans expect them to be paired together to start the season under Eakins stewardship. However, this being the absolutely right thing to do should still be questioned.
On one side of the coin, it is undeniable that these two players have a symbiotic relationship and that they both play far better together than when apart. By default, when two of the 5 players your team is going to ice at a given time are playing well, that flow-on effect is felt for the duration of their time on ice. This was written about in more detail by Alex Novet who suggests that hockey is a “strong link game” or more perhaps more aptly stated, that the team with the best players on the ice will usually win. That is to say, for the ~25 minutes these two players are on the ice, the Ducks are a better team.
The other side of the coin is what then of the remaining ~35 minutes? Taking Novet’s conclusion to the next step, it makes some sense to distribute talent throughout the line-up, so that high-end talent is on the ice more often. That is to say, if Lindholm and Manson were separated, and if Lindholm was on the ice for ~25 minutes, and Manson was on for a separate ~25 minute period of time, the Ducks would have high-end talent on the ice for ~50 minutes of a 60-minute game. This hypothesis has further support from Dawson Sprigings, who suggests that balancing elite talent throughout the line-up has a better return on investment than consolidating it in one place.
The Anaheim Ducks, under Bruce Boudreau, could afford to play Lindholm and Manson together. They, at the time, had a wealth of defensive depth. The envy of the league, in fact, and all of it was young and talented. Certainly talented enough to make up for some of the weaker veteran players that were signed to fill in the experience gap at the time.
This season’s version, however, boasts far less depth than in previous seasons. Cam Fowler is still a Duck, however, behind him, there are more questions than answers. With Brandon Montour no longer with the organization, the most experienced NHL veteran is Michael Del Zotto. Korbin Holzer is the veteran defenseman behind him. Both of these players are perhaps best suited to 3rd pairing roles.
Jani Hakanpaa was signed as a player out of Finland, and while optimism may be high, the expectation should be low for the 25-year-olds first season in the NHL. Brendan Guhle, Jakob Larsson, Josh Mahura await their turn to play, and while their talent levels may be noteworthy, they’re still very much unproven.
Thus spreading the Ducks talent about the line-up, in this case separating Lindholm and Manson, makes some sense. At the very least the concept of spreading talent should be given serious consideration.
Considering the Options
However, it doesn’t mean it needs to be forever, nor even for the entirety of games. The basis for the spread of talent is so that the Ducks have high-end players on the ice at all times. The more high-end players they have, the easier this becomes and the sooner the Lindholm-Manson pairing can be reestablished. Currently, there are two options for this:
- That the Ducks acquire a highly talented top 4 defenseman. While unlikely, there were rumors that Bob Murray had put in a bid for Kevin Shattenkirk’s services, prior to him signing in Tampa Bay.
- The other option is that one of the current team members can step up to become a bona fide top 4 player. Presently there is hope for Guhle and Mahura to take that role, given their strong play in, albeit short samples in the recent past.
Additionally, there are obvious game situations in which it would necessitate a Lindholm-Manson pairing for team success. Game-close situations come to mind. Should the Ducks be holding onto a lead with minimal time remaining, and the game is there to be won, then reuniting your best shut down pairing would be a good move.
It would take a shrewd coach to pick the right time to do so, without subjecting players to excessive fatigue or put that pairing out too early, have them need a change, and have a weaker pairing on the ice in a key moment. It would most certainly take a shrewd coach to identify when this may be necessary and manage the bench accordingly. All that to say that Eakins should consider immersing himself in the data that is available, and at least consider the options.
The Long Pass
As a result of being on the receiving end of a sweep from the San Jose Sharks, the Ducks overreacted and pushed a playing style upon the team that they didn’t have the cattle to execute. The Sharks during their sweep were often seen making a long pass through the neutral zone to open ice in front of the high forward but behind the Ducks rear-guard. This pass to space allowed the Sharks forward to get in behind the Ducks defencemen, by utilizing two key points against them.
First, it is easier to skate fast without the puck. Even in sports such as soccer, it is difficult to ball handle while attempting to execute a maximum speed sprint. However, running onto a loose ball means that the attacking player already has been able to accelerate to a maximum pace and make few ball handling decisions once they reach the ball itself.
In this case, the Sharks forward could accelerate rapidly and once receiving the puck simply maintain their speed rather than needing to place more effort into acceleration. The second point is that the Ducks defenseman was required to either skate backward or turn around, to intercept the pass or player. Both of these movements are far slower than skating forwards.
Taken together, the Sharks forwards acceleration and the Ducks defenseman reduced speed, separating between the forward and defenseman can be established. This separation provides time with the forward to work with, and time allows for more options to be considered or utilized. Each further option is likely to create further space or room to work with.
Due to the freedom of puck movement, this stratagem appeared to be playing “fast.” Recognizing, and verbally communicating to the media, that the Sharks were not a team of fast skaters, Bob Murray directed the Anaheim Ducks under Randy Carlyle to implement a similar system of play. In itself, directing a team to play a faster style is not problematic. Ryan Stimson has the following to say in his book Tape to Space: Redefining Modern Hockey Tactic:
“Say a team attempts thirty shots and yields 20, resulting in controlling 60% of the shots. Now say that team plays a faster game and attempts 48 shots and yields 32, resulting in them controlling 60% of the shots. What has changed?”
The obvious answer is that the team controlling 60% of the shots has increased the shot differential from 10 to 16. We know that statistically speaking that a goalie on any night will have an average save percentage of x. Thus increasing the total number of shots is likely to increase the number of goals scored, should all other variables remain the same. A clear rationale for teams who control the play, to increase the pace of their games rather than slow them down.
Nevertheless, the inverse is also true. Should the team controlling 40% of the game’s shots increase the pace of the game, then they are likely to be outshot by more and thus be scored on more. The Ducks, of course, were one of those teams which were regularly outshot. In their case, pushing the tempo rather than slowing it down resulted in them being outshot by historic levels. At least in the early season.
It’s also worth noting that following Randy Carlyle’s departure from the team, the Ducks reverted to a system that was much closure to what Carlyle has implemented in the 2 seasons prior. That is to say a more reasonably paced game. They pushed the pace when it suited them, but for much of the time, it was far slower than it had been at the seasons start. While the return to health and match fitness of a number of the Anaheim Ducks better players was undoubtedly the underpinning cause of the improvement, the slower-paced game plan also helped to improve the overall shot metrics.
Lessons to Be Learned
While the long pass play could be considered an abject failure for the Ducks last season, it’s usage does present a number of learning curves for Coach Eakin’s should he wish to view them.
Firstly, passing into open space should be a high priority for the coach. It seems like it doesn’t need mentioning, yet how often have the Ducks (with the man advantage) pass the puck around to a player who is more or less standing still?
Ryan Getzlaf back to Cam Fowler the point, Fowler across the blue line, back to Fowler or down into the corner. Rinse, wash, and repeat. In sports like soccer or field hockey, it is typical for the attacking team to attempt to increase the depth and width of the field, whereas the defensive team looks to make it more narrow and shallow.
Creating space, creates time, and giving skilled players time to work with the puck allows them to find and create further options. Eventually, gaps will open and scoring opportunities will arise. The concept works as well at even strength.
Secondly, don’t force the players into a system. Create a new system based on the strengths of the players you have. Last season’s Ducks didn’t really have the capability to play a fast-paced game for 60 minutes. Whether that was due to injury, match fitness, conditioning, or simply player archetype is beyond the scope of this article.
Nonetheless, building game styles around your players seems to be the best idea. Taking that point further, this would suggest that each 5 man unit (3 forwards and 2 defensemen) would play in a slightly different manner. This would give a twofold effect of optimizing your player’s strengths, and to confuse the opposition which now has to adapt to the changing strategy.
Finally, do the unexpected. The league may currently be running with certain trends, and they may be the trends of winning teams. However, mimicry simply puts the Anaheim Ducks in step with other teams. They may be better than some or worse than others, but it provides no tactical advantage to copycat another teams game style. Be bold. Break the mold. Outside of the long pass, Carlyle’s team last season used the central corridor more than most teams.
This offensive zone entry point allows the fulcrum of the offensive “triangle” to have the most space to work with, as opposed to starting on a wing and having only one direction to go in (towards center ice). It’s hard to say whether this worked out, given that the Ducks as a team finished the season 50 goals below the league median. Trial and error.
Don’t be afraid of failure. If the data can support a reasoning to trial something, then try it. With that said, if another team is doing something that will work for your team, then steal it. Take it and run. Unashamedly. But don’t do it because it works for them, do it because it works for your players.
Defensive Stratagem’s
There are of course other pieces of the Ducks play last season, and in days past that, which may be used for learning purposes. While not solely a Ducks-centric defensive stratagem, and more one that Carlyle had taken with him to every coaching stop, the Ducks under Randy Carlyle, the Ducks would typically attempt to overload one portion of the ice and attempt to minimize the space the attacking puck handler would have to work with.
Specifically, there would often be four of the Ducks defensive unit closing onto an opposition player and forcing them into a corner. This essentially divided the defensive zone into quarters, with the puck handler, the puck, and an overwhelming number of Ducks players all in one-quarter of the ice. This stratagem has some positive aspects to it, however, it similarly has a glaring flaw.
If the puck handler can move the puck outside of this confined space, the opposition team would have players in open space. It also has an impact on the Anaheim Ducks players who would have to accelerate rapidly to reach those opposition players. That acceleration increases player fatigue, which over a game accumulates. Players with greater levels of fatigue tend to make poor tactical decisions, present a decline in the execution of skills, and may increase their risk of injury.
This system of defense was somewhat mimicked in the past by Eakins himself. The “swarm” defense he implemented in Edmonton, required the doubling up of defensive players onto a single opposition offensive player. The first defensive player would skate in and pin the offensive player along the boards, with the second defensive player coming in to strip the puck away.
Like Carlyle’s strategy above, Eakins strategy left offensive players alone in open ice. If the second player moved in before the first had effectively pinned the offensive player to the boards, the offensive player was able to get the pass off to a teammate. The issues here are similar to those described above.
Dallas Eakins Can Learn From His Past Mistakes
Eakins did, in the past, admit that that “swarm” defense was a flawed strategy, so it seems unlikely that he would revisit it. Particularly given the harm it caused his career and reputation. Eakins would be wise to review both coaching strategies and find the rationales for why they didn’t work, before implementing his own, newer, defensive strategy.
Hopefully, since his Edmonton days, Eakins has sourced the hockey world for new idea’s. It was a criticism during his Edmonton days, that his players often looked lost on the ice. He admitted during a press conference with the Edmonton Journal that his players didn’t have a sound understanding of defensive structure.
“My bad,” he said. “I assumed that we knew what traditional d-zone coverage was and it was clear that we didn’t.”
This may be in part due to the lack of intensity shown during practices. Although this is just circumstantial rumors that abounded at the time. Since then, however, Eakins has had quite a few years with the Ducks prospects on which to build his knowledge, each of which would have further helped his learning curve in their own way.
Nick Ritchie spent very little time in the AHL due to his goal-scoring prowess there, yet when he arrived in the NHL he looked unsure of where to be on the ice at any given time. Given previous concerns about his NHL players looking lost on the ice, this should prove to be the point that Eakins could make to himself. Drill the players often. While drills may get bad press, they’re put in place as learning tools, so that the players may move without thinking. Positioning and movements become ingrained in certain situations.
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Brandon Montour, highly touted for his offense yet maligned for his defense in junior, continued that trend into his professional career. While he certainly improved over the years while with the Anaheim Ducks, he came into the league after spending time in the AHL, with no defensive nous to show for it.
Similarly, Jaycob Megna, Andy Welinski, and Marcus Pettersson, all struggled initially with their defensive plays and positioning. Jacob Larsson has yet to make it back into the NHL after his initial positive stint. These struggles may be attributed to the players in general, however, the coach’s primary role is as a teacher. As was the case in Edmonton, the players may not have a base understanding of defensive zone plays. Or at the very least, it may not be their strong point.
From the defense, offense is generated. Thus Eakins would do well to head his own mistakes of the past, and ensure his players are fully aware of where they need to be and what they need to be doing. Darryl Sutter taking the role he has should help improve Eakins where he has traditionally been weak. The former assistant to Darryl Sutter, John Stevens had the following to say, during an interview with the LA times:
“Darryl’s attention to preparation was unbelievable, and his attention to the emotional preparation of a hockey team, I thought, was unbelievable. He was relentless in the preparation and how important every game was and how much emphasis he put on the individual being prepared, and that certainly left an imprint on me.”
The Ducks may get the best of both worlds. A shrewd tactician, with an eye for detail, in Sutter, and of course they have their guy in Eakins leading the show. If he can learn from the mistakes of the past, the Ducks could be in good hands.
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